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CIVIL PROCEDURE
GARY L. GORDON* and RUDOLPH LUCERO**
As usual, a large number of New Mexico appellate court decisions
during the survey year concerned civil procedure. The only area of civil
procedure which was changed significantly during the survey year was
that of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.' This survey article is basically
a catalog of the decisions during the survey year.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Two remarkably similar cases resulted in dismissals for lack of juris-
diction over non-resident defendants.2 In both cases the plaintiffs were
attempting to assert jurisdiction based upon phone calls which the de-
fendants had made from Colorado to New Mexico.3 To vest New Mexico
courts with personal jurisdiction, the act complained of must meet a three-
pronged test: (1) the defendant must do one of the acts enumerated in
the New Mexico long-arm statute,4 (2) the plaintiff's cause of action must
arise from the act, and (3) the defendant must have minimum contacts
with New Mexico sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process.5 In Valley
Wide Health Services, Inc. v. Graham, the defendant physician had in-
itially treated the plaintiff's daughter in a Colorado health care clinic and
later returned a phone call to the father, who resided in New Mexico.6
In Salas v. Homestake Enterprises, Inc., the defendant had called the
New Mexico plaintiff and invited him to go to Colorado to negotiate a
contract.7 In both cases, the supreme court affirmed the trial courts' de-
*Gary L. Gordon is with the firm of Miller, Stratvert, Torgerson & Schlenker, P.A. and practices
primarily in the area of tort litigation. Mr. Gordon graduated from the University of New Mexico
School of Law in 1986.
**Rudolph Lucero is also with the firm of Miller, Stratvert, Torgerson & Schlenker, P.A. and he
also practices primarily in the area of tort litigation. Mr. Lucero graduated from the Stanford
University School of Law in 1985.
I. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
2. Salas v. Homestake Enterprises, Inc., 106 N.M. 344, 742 P.2d 1049 (1987); Valley Wide
Health Services, Inc. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 71, 738 P.2d 1316 (1987).
3. Valley Wide, 106 N.M. at 72, 738 P.2d at 1317; Salas, 106 N.M. at 345; 742 P.2d at 1050.
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16(A) (1978).
5. Salas, 106 N.M. at 345, 742 P.2d at 1050; Valley Wide, 106 N.M. at 72-73, 738 P.2d at 1317-
18.
6. Valley Wide, 106 N.M. at 72, 730 P.2d at 1317.
7. Salas. 106 N.M. at 345. 742 P.2d at 1050.
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cisions that the defendants' phone calls were insufficient contacts with
New Mexico to invoke personal jurisdiction.'
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The courts decided two cases involving service of process on defend-
ants, and their lawyers' entries of appearance, which should give New
Mexico lawyers reason to exercise caution when filing entries of ap-
pearance.9 In Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc., plaintiff had attempted
service of process upon the defendant foreign corporation under the statute
which allows such service to be accomplished by serving the Secretary
of State.' 0 In this particular case, however, the Secretary of State failed
to forward a copy of the process or otherwise notify the defendant cor-
poration. " After entry of a default judgment, the defendant corporation
entered its general appearance and moved to set aside the default judg-
ment. " After the entry of appearance was filed, the plaintiff argued that
any defective service of process was cured and that the default judgment
should stand. 3 The court disagreed, holding that fundamental due process
considerations could not allow such a result.' 4 The court noted that it did
not make sense, nor was it logical, to require that certain fundamental
notions of notice be extended to litigants under Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co. 5 and its progeny, if they can be taken away when
a party enters an appearance attempting to cure a default judgment. 6 The
court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant corporation's mo-
tion to set aside the default judgment and remanded for a trial on the
merits. 7
In State Savings & Loan Association of Lubbock v. E.E. Anderson
Co., 8 the court drew a distinction between simply entering'an appearance
on behalf of a party, and entering an appearance and reciting that service
is accepted on behalf of that party.1" The court held that a mere entry of
appearance preserves the right to challenge personal jurisdiction, but an
8. Id.; Valley Wide, 106 N.M. at 72, 730 P.2d at 1317.
9. Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc., 106 N.M. 25, 738 P.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1987); State Say. &
Loan Ass'n of Lubbock v. E.E. Anderson Co., 106 N.M. 607, 747 P.2d 253 (1987).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-6 (1978).
11. Abarca, 106 N.M. at 25,738 P2d at 519.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 26, 738 P.2d at 520.
14. Id.
15. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane, the Supreme Court held that when notice is a person's
due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.
16. Abarca, 106 N.M. at 26, 738 P.2d at 520.
17. Id. at 26, 738 P.2d at 520.
18. 106 N.M. 607, 747 P.2d 253 (1987).
19. id. at 608, 747 P.2d at 254.
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entry of appearance which also accepts service on behalf of a party acts
to waive any objection to personal jurisdiction.2"
111. JUDGE SELECTION
Althoughoit was a criminal case, State v. Fero" announced rules of
general application regarding Article VI, Section 18 of the New Mexico
Constitution, which requires a judge to recuse himself in any case when
the judge is related to "either of the parties . . . or in which he has an
interest." 22 In a companion civil case, the victim's family had filed a
wrongful death action against the criminal murder defendant.23 That case
was assigned to the same judge who was assigned to hear the criminal
case. 24 In the civil case, the victim's family was represented by the judge's
brother-in-law. 25 Furthermore, during the course of the criminal trial, it
became known that the district attorney had employed the judge's son as
a law clerk. 26 The defense had moved to disqualify the judge on both
grounds.27 Based upon those facts, the court agreed that it would have
been improper for the judge to hear the civil case, but the court also
noted that the judge had properly disqualified himself from the civil case.28
It was not improper for the judge to continue to hear the criminal case,
even though the district attorney employed his son as a law clerk.29 The
court first noted that the son's employment as a law clerk could not be
stretched to make him a "party" in the constitutional sense.3" The court
also noted that the son did not live with his father and that there had been
no evidence of any private conversations between the two regarding the
case. 3
IV. COURT SELECTION
In two separate cases, the New Mexico appellate courts appeared re-
luctant to disturb a plaintiff's selection of venue where the trial court had
articulated a reasonable basis for denying motions for change of venue.32
20. Id.
21. 105 N.M. 339, 732 P.2d 866 (1987).
22. N.M. CONST. art. Vi, § 18.
23. Fero, 105 N.M. at 342, 732 P.2d at 869.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 342-43, 732 P.2d at 869-70.
29. Id. at 343, 732 P.2d at 870.
30. Id. at 342, 732 P.2d at 869.
31. Id. at 343, 732 P.2d at 870.
32. Lopez v. Truck Stops Corp. of Am., 105 N.M. 782, 737 P.2d 894 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
105 N.M. 720, 737 P.2d 79 (1987); Meier v. Davignon, 105 N.M. 567, 734 P.2d 807 (1987).
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In Lopez v. Truck Stops Corporation ofAmerica, the defendant had sought
a change of venue under the venue statute claiming that it had a reasonable
apprehension or well-grounded fear that it could not attain an impartial
jury in the venue the plaintiff had selected.3 3 The plaintiff, however, had
offered evidence in opposition to the motion.34 On appeal, the court held
that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision
to deny the motion for change of venue." It was the trial court's province
to weigh the evidence presented and decide whether the defendant's
assertions were well-taken.36
Similarly, in Meier v. Davignon, the supreme court found that it was
not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to continue to exercise
jurisdiction when faced with a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.37 The case involved a child custody dispute.38 The
trial court's exercise of jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion where
the trial judge who refused to decline jurisdiction was the same trial judge
who had heard and granted the original divorce, and who had heard the
various ensuing disputes concerning custody and visitation.39
V. DISCOVERY
Smith v. Ashby' is a significant decision in the area of discovery in
personal injury litigation. Smith involved a standard procedure in personal
injury litigation in which the defendant requests the plaintiff to sign a
document authorizing the plaintiff's health care providers to release in-
formation regarding the plaintiff's condition.4' In Smith, the defendant's
document requested disclosure to defense counsel "of any and all infor-
mation" in the doctor's possession which concerned the plaintiff.42 The
trial court had ordered the plaintiff to sign such a release, but the plaintiff
took the matter to the supreme court requesting the issuance of a writ of
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§38-3-3, 38-3-5 (1978).
34. Lopez, 105 N.M. at 783, 737 P.2d at 895.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Meier v. Davignon, 105 N.M. 567, 571, 734 P.2d 807, 811 (1987).
38. Id. at 568, 734 P.2d at 898.
39. Id. at 569, 734 P.2d at 899.
40. 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987). The only other decision in the discovery area during
the survey year was Bishop v. Lloyd McKee Motors, Inc., 105 N.M. 399, 733 P.2d 368 (Ct. App.
1987), which held that an extreme sanction such as the entry of a default judgment may only be
employed where the failure to comply with discovery involves a conscious or intentional failure, as
distinguished from an accidental or involuntary non-compliance. Sandoval v. United Nuclear Corp.,
105 N.M. 105, 729 P.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1986).
41. Smith, 106 N.M. at 359, 743 P.2d at 115.
42. Id.
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superintending control preventing enforcement of the court's order re-
quiring the plaintiff to sign the release. 3
The supreme court noted that New Mexico does not recognize any
doctor-patient privilege as it applies to the Rules of Evidence." At the
same time, however, many physicians consider it a breach of confiden-
tiality to release any information without the patient's consent.45 In Smith,
the plaintiff had agreed that any and all information sought "may be
furnished by [the plaintiff's] doctor, if [the plaintiff's] attorneys are pres-
ent at the time any oral communications are made by the doctor to defense
counsel. "'
The supreme court decided that forcing plaintiffs to sign a release which
created a situation where "a physician can engage in an ex parte con-
ference with the legal adversary of his patient" would endanger the trust
and faith invested in him by his patient. 7 The court also found that
refusing to order personal injury plaintiffs to sign such releases encouraged
non-formal discovery at the most inexpensive level.48 Finally, the court
noted that a patient may not necessarily have any objections to ex parte
communications between his doctor and defense counsel, but when the
patient objects to ex parte communications, the trial court should not
order an overly broad release.49
The Smith opinion does not discuss the most likely scenario. Lawyers
representing personal injury plaintiffs will obviously be inclined to force
defendants to follow Smith insofar as it prohibits courts from ordering
plaintiffs to authorize ex parte communications between the plaintiff's
doctor and defense counsel. However, not all physicians may feel that it
is unethical or improper to discuss a patient's care without a release.
Thus, in many cases, it may be evident that the patient desires no ex
parte communications but that the doctor is more than willing to discuss
the case with defense counsel. In such a situation, the Smith decision
will not bar ex parte communications between defense counsel and the
plaintiff's physician.
VI. PLEADINGS
During the survey year, the New Mexico appellate courts decided a
number of cases involving pleadings. Although many of the cases do not
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 111. App. 3d 581, 102 Ill. Dec. 172,
499 N.E.2d 952 (1986)).
48. Id. at 360, 743 P.2d at 116.
49. Id.
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announce significant changes in the law,5" the following may be of value
to the practitioner.
The New Mexico courts continued to follow a long line of cases which
allows plaintiffs great leeway in the manner in which they raise claims
in their complaints. 5 In Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Center, Inc.,52
the complaint alleged that the defendant had sold a defective dump truck
to plaintiff's employer and that the plaintiff was operating the truck when
the bed came off causing the cab, in which the plaintiff was sitting, to
jerk violently.53 The plaintiff's complaint specifically alleged claims for
relief grounded in negligence and breach of warranty but did not state a
claim under strict liability.54 The court, however, held that the plaintiff
had not waived his strict liability claim by failing to include the claim in
his complaint or to otherwise label any count in the complaint as a strict
liability theory." The court upheld prior case law which stated that "magic
language is not required." 56
In a similar decision regarding counterclaims, the court held that an
allegation which is denominated as a counterclaim in a defendant's answer
may be treated as an affirmative defense, regardless of its title, if the
allegations of the pleadings so require.57 In Quirico v. Lopez, the defendant
had answered and asserted three counterclaims against plaintiff.58 The
plaintiff never responded to any of the counterclaims.59 The court granted
relief on two of the counterclaims and offset that relief against the entire
judgment." The defendant then argued that the third claim for relief should
have also been granted, because of the plaintiff's failure to respond to
the allegations denoted as a counterclaim. 6' The court held, however, that
the third claim was merely a restatement of an affirmative defense, which
required no response by plaintiff.62
50. Western Commerce Bank v. Reliance Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 346, 732 P.2d 873 (1987) (judgment
on the pleadings); Hem v. Crist, 105 N.M. 645, 735 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M.
644, 735 P.2d 1150 (1987); Johnson v. Francke, 105 N.M. 564, 734 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1987);
Saenz v. Morris, 106 N.M. 530, 746 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1987).
51. Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Center, Inc., 105 N.M. 422, 733 P.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1987).
The Armijo decision follows a long line of New Mexico cases allowing pleadings to be liberally
construed. See Hambaugh v. Peoples, 75 N.M. 144, 153, 401 P.2d 777, 782 (1965); Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Sydow, 97 N.M. 51, 636 P.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1981); Las Luminarias of the New Mexico
Council of the Blind v. Isengard, 92 N.M. 297, 587 P.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1978).
52. Armijo, 105 N.M. 422, 733 P.2d 870.
53. Id. at 423, 733 P.2d at 871.
54. Id. at 424, 733 P.2d at 872.
55. id.
56. Id.
57. Quirico v. Lopez, 106 N.M. 169, 740 P.2d 1153 (1987).
58. Id. at 170, 740 P.2d at 1154.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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The court also applied a liberal standard in Bombach v. Battershell,
which involved amendment to the pleadings.63 In that case, a metropolitan
court rule regarding amendment to the pleadings was construed to permit
amendment at any stage of the proceedings, including at the conclusion
of the plaintiff's case. 6' The plaintiff had originally sued to evict the
defendant for non-payment of rent, but just eight days before trial on the
eviction matter, another cause of action under the lease arose, regarding
a 90-day notice period which had expired." The operative facts of both
causes of action had ripened by the time of trial.' 6 Because the defendants
were on notice that the lease contained the 90-day notice provision, it
was not improper for the trial court to allow the plaintiff to amend the
complaint to add a second cause of action at the close of the plaintiff's
case.67 Furthermore, the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for
a continuance of the trial because of the amendment to the pleadings was
not a clear abuse of discretion warranting reversal."M
Other cases, however, were not as generous in construing various
pleadings. For example, in Fireman's Insurance Co. of Newark, New
Jersey v. Bustani,69 the court strictly construed New Mexico's interpleader
rule against a claimant in favor of the stakeholder. Fireman's Insurance
Co. holds that the filing of an interpleader action does not constitute an
irrevocable admission of liability to the extent of the funds deposited.70
The insurance company had filed an interpleader action naming two pos-
sible claimants. 7 One of the claimants filed a wrongful death action in
federal court against the insured and the other consolidated its wrongful
death action against the same insured in the state court interpleader ac-
tion.72 The federal court jury returned a verdict in favor of the insured,
awarding no money to the claimant.73 Both claimants then moved the
state district court for distribution of the interpleaded funds. 7 After the
federal court jury decision against the claimant, Fireman's sought dis-
missal without prejudice of its interpleader action, asserting that the funds
should be returned because the federal verdict barred one of the claims."
The supreme court held that New Mexico's interpleader rule avoids the
63. 105 N.M. 625, 735 P.2d 1131 (1987).
64. Id. at 626, 735 P.2d at 1132.
65. id.
66. Id. at 627, 735 P.2d at 1133.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 105 N.M. 760, 737 P.2d 541 (1987).
70. Id. at 761, 737 P.2d at 542.
71. Id. at 760, 737 P.2d at 541.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id:
75. Id. at 760-61, 737 P.2d at 541-42.
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general rule that the payment or deposit of the fund or property into the
court registry constitutes an admission by the stakeholder of liability to
someone.76 Essentially, the federal court verdict against one of the two
claimants had eliminated the dispute over the interpleaded funds, and the
remaining claimant was free to establish the claim in a standard negligence
action."
In a case involving substitution of parties under Rule 1-025(C), the
court also construed the Rules of Civil Procedure against the pleaders.78
In Daniels Insurance, Inc. v. Daon Corp.,79 the court held that a substi-
tution of parties and assignment of a cause of action owned by a general
partnership in favor of other parties must contain the consent of all the
general partners."0 A real party-in-interest is the one who is the owner of
the right being enforced and is in a position to discharge the defendant
from the asserted liability.8 ' Although a general partnership may transfer
its interest in a cause of action to another entity, that transfer can only
be accomplished with the consent of all the general partners.82 Absent an
express written consent by the appropriate partners, the trial court must
make a specific factual finding that the assignment was ratified by any
partner who failed to expressly consent.83 Thus, where a partnership
wishes to assign a cause of action to another party, the lawyer must be
sure that all general partners expressly consent in writing.
Finally, in Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reed,84 the supreme
court clarified its important ruling in Tipton v. Texaco, Inc.8" concerning
Rule 1-014(A). Rule 1-014(A) allows a defendant to bring a third-party
action against a party who is or may be liable to the defendant for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant.86 Tipton has liberally
construed Rule 1-014 to allow third-party complaints against concurrent
tortfeasors whose liability for contribution New Mexico abolished when
76. It should be noted that the insurance company's interpleader action was carefully worded in
that regard. The court's decision quotes Fireman's prayer for relief as follows:
[The court is requested to] order that the defendants who may make claim to the
proceeds herein described interplead and establish their respective claims and
that the plaintiff be discharged from any other or further liability to said defendants
by virtue of the payment of full amounts of the proceeds under the registry of
the court.
(Emphasis in original.) Id. at 761, 737 P.2d at 542.
77. Id. at 761,737 P.2d at 542.
78. Daniels Ins., Inc. v. Daon Corp., 106 N.M. 328, 742 P.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1987).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 332, 742 P.2d at 544.
81. Id. at 331, 742 P.2d at 543.
82. Id. at 332, 742 P.2d at 544.
83. Id. at 333, 742 P.2d at 545.
84. 105 N.M. 586, 734 P.2d 1269 (1987).
85. 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985).
86. SCRA 1986, 1-014(A).
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it recognized comparative negligence. 7 Grain Dealers limits the rule
announced in Tipton. It holds that Rule 1-014(A) generally does not permit
a third-party plaintiff to bring a third-party complaint on the basis of the
third-party defendant's liability to the original plaintiff.8 In Grain Deal-
ers, an insurance company sought a declaratory judgment that it was not
liable to its insured.8 9 The insured then brought a third-party complaint
against her insurance agent claiming that the agent "had breached the
insurance policy" or "had negligently failed to procure insurance" for
the insured.' The insurance agent appealed the trial court's denial of its
motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.9 ' Reversing the trial court,
the supreme court held that because the agent could not possibly be
secondarily liable to the insured, the third-party complaint was improper.9"
Absent concurrent tortfeasors as in Tipton, Rule 1-014 only allows a
third-party complaint when there is a possibility that the third-party de-
fendant will be secondarily liable to the third-party plaintiff.93
VII. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The courts decided several cases involving statutes of limitation. All
of the cases are important to the practitioner because of the obvious pitfall
that statutes of limitation present every practicing lawyer.
In Moncor Trust Co. v. Feil,94 the plaintiff argued that the minority of
the decedent's surviving children tolled the statute of limitations in the
Medical Malpractice Act.95 The court disagreed with the plaintiff's theory
and held that the statute's tolling provision for minor children did not
apply to decedent's surviving children.' In Moncor, the decedent died
in 1978 due to alleged malpractice.91 More than six years later, the bank,
as personal representative of the decedent, filed a wrongful death action
against decedent's physician.98 The eldest of the decedent's two surviving
children attained the age of nine, two months after the complaint was
87. Tipton, 103 N.M. at 692-93, 712 P.2d at 1354-55.
88. Grain Dealers, 105 N.M. at 588, 734 P.2d at 1271.
89. 105 N.M. at 586, 734 P.2d at 1269.
90. Id. at 586-87, 734 P.2d at 1269-70.
91. Id. at 587, 734 P.2d at 1270.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 587, 734 P.2d at 1270. The Grain Dealers decision notes that traditionally a third-
party defendant must be secondarily liable to the defendant/third-party plaintiff on a theory such as
contribution or indemnity in the event that the defendant is held liable to the plaintiff. Thus, Grain
Dealers makes clear the holding in Tipton that practice under Rule 1-014 has only been changed in
situations involving concurrent tortfeasors.
94. 105 N.M. 444,733 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 421, 733 P.2d 869 (1987).
95. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
96. 105 N.M. at 446-47, 733 P.2d at 1329-30.
97. Id. at 445, 733 P.2d at 1328.
98. Id.
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filed." The statute of limitations in the Medical Malpractice Act provides
that a malpractice action shall be filed within three years after the date
the malpractice occurred, except that a minor under the age of six years
shall have until his ninth birthday in which to file."o The plaintiff argued
that this tolling provision should apply to decedent's minor children.'°'
The court, however, held that the tolling provisions applicable to minors
in the Act apply only to those who suffer an alleged act of malpractice
and not those who are beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act.' 02
During the survey year, the New Mexico courts also addressed the
question of which statute of limitations applies to federal civil rights
actions filed in New Mexico state courts.'0 3 The court decided that the
three-year statute of limitation for personal injury applies to civil rights
actions brought in state court. 104 In the decision, the court followed the
mandate of Wilson v. Garcia'5 which held that the choice of the applicable
state statute of limitations in a Section 1983 case is a matter of federal,
not state, law and that the applicable state statute is the one which covers
claims for personal injuries. "o Thus, for New Mexico, the personal injury
statute of limitations of three years is the relevant limitation statute. 107
In two different cases, the courts addressed the question of the tolling
of a statute of limitations based upon equitable defenses or public policy
considerations.' 8 In Dolezal v. Blevins, the court held that the statute of
limitations, based upon an existing judgment in favor of a wife against
her husband, is tolled during the period of their remarriage. "0 The parties
were divorced in 1973, but were remarried five months later. '° The
original property settlement in the divorce ordered the husband to pay
the wife $50,000 over approximately ten years. "' After their remarriage,
99. Id.
100. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-13 (1978).
101. 105 N.M. at 446-47, 733 P.2d at 1329-30; cf. Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico v.
Armijo, 103 N.M. 174, 704 P.2d 428 (1985) (minority of decedent, who can be neither proper party
nor beneficiary in wrongful death action, should not inure to benefit of adult person or representative
who is under no legal disability).
102. 105 N.M. at 447, 733 P.2d at 1329.
103. Walker v. Marufli, 105 N.M. 763, 737 P.2d 544 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 707,
736 P.2d 494 (1987).
104. Id. at 769, 737 P.2d at 550.
105. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
106. Walker. 105 N.M. at 765, 737 P.2d at 546.
107. Id. at 769, 737 P.2d at 550. The choice of the personal injury statute of limitations rejects
the approach in DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 563, 642
P.2d 166 (1982), in which the court held that the applicable statute of limitations was the two-year
statute found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.
108. Dolezal v. Blevins, 105 N.M. 562, 734 P.2d 802 (Ct. App. 1987); Molinar v. City of
Carlsbad, 105 N.M. 628, 735 P.2d 1134 (1987).
109. Dolezal, 105 N.M. at 563, 734 P.2d at 803.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 562, 734 P.2d at 802.
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the parties remained maried until 1981 when they were divorced again." 2
The wife filed a complaint in 1984 seeking judgment on the unpaid
indebtedness. 3 The trial court dismissed the action under the seven-year
statute of limitations for actions founded upon judgments, but the court
of appeals reversed, holding that the statute was tolled during the period
of the parties' remarriage." 4
Molinar v. City of Carlsbad also dealt with a tolling of a statute of
limitations." ' In Molinar, the plaintiff's lawyers had met several times
with the defendant's lawyer in an attempt to settle the dispute prior to
filing any lawsuit. ",6 When the lawyers failed to reach an agreement, the
plaintiff filed suit." 7 As a defense, the City asserted that the statute of
limitations had expired." 8 The plaintiff's lawyers argued that the statute
should have been tolled during the negotiation stage because they had
relied upon the representation of the defendant's lawyer that a settlement
would be forthcoming. '" The court found substantial evidence that the
plaintiff had postponed filing suit upon the request of the City.'20 Because
reasonable reliance upon the representations of the defendant's lawyer
led to the expiration of the limitation period, 2' the court held that equitable
considerations estopped the defendant from prevailing on its defense of
statute of limitations. ,22
Finally, in Welty v. Western Bank of Las Cruces, '23 the court held that
the statute of limitations on contract obligations payable in installments
would begin to run only with respect to each installment when due.
Plaintiff was indebted to the bank under a real estate contract which
required installment payments over a period of several years.'24 When
plaintiff defaulted on the contract and did not cure for nearly six years,
the bank terminated the contract. '25 A year later, plaintiff sued the bank
for slander of title, but the district court granted summary judgment for
the bank on its counterclaim to quiet title. '26 On appeal, plaintiff argued
that New Mexico's six-year statute of limitations on written contracts
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 563, 734 P.2d at 803.
115. Molinar, 105 N.M. 628, 735 P.2d 1134 (1987).
116. Id. at 630, 735 P.2d at 1136.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 631, 735 P.2d at 1137.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Welty v. Western Bank of Las Cruces, 106 N.M. 126, 740 P.2d 120 (1987).
124. Id. at 127, 740 P.2d at 121.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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barred the bank from terminating the contract.' 27 The court found, how-
ever, that the six-year statute of limitations had not run before the bank
filed suit because a provision in the contract prohibited the bank from
terminating the contract for thirty days after a demand was made on the
purchaser. '28 These thirty days were sufficient to put the bank's suit within
the six-year period.' 29 In reaching this holding, the court also stated that
if the bank had sued to accelerate the payments instead of to terminate
the contract, the six-year statute of limitations would only have run with
respect to those installments due more than six years prior to the date
suit was filed. 130
VIII. TRIAL
By far the most significant decision regarding trial procedure in the
survey year was the case of Baum v. Orosco.'' In that case, the court
of appeals held that the trial court's decision to bifurcate the trial under
Rule 42 was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, which
would not be disturbed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 32 The
plaintiff, a police officer, was involved in an altercation with the two
defendants and some other police officers.'33 The police officer filed suit,
seeking judgment for injuries he alleged he sustained as a result of the
battery the defendant committed. ' 4 One of the defendants brought a
counterclaim against the police officers' employers based upon claims of
excessive force, false arrest and false imprisonment. ,' The trial court
decided that for the defendant's counterclaims against the plaintiff's em-
ployer to succeed, there must first be a finding that the plaintiff police
officer was liable. '36 Thus, the trial court bifurcated the police officer's
claim and the counterclaims and did not allow any evidence in the first
trial regarding the defendant's supervisory control counterclaims. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer, and the second part
127. Id. at 128, 740 P.2d at 122.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 106 N.M. 265, 742 P.2d I (Ct. App. 1987). Other decisions in the trial area included Fuson
v. State, 105 N.M. 632, 735 P.2d 1138 (1987) (prejudice is presumed when a party is compelled
to use peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause and that party exercises
all of his or her peremptory challenges before the court completes the venire); Carraro v. Wells Fargo
Mortgage & Equity, 106 N.M. 442, 744 P.2d 915 (1987) (co-defendants were each allowed five
peremptory challenges after consideration by the trial court of whether the defendants were adverse).
132. Baum, 106 N.M. at 268, 742 P.2d at 4.
133. Id. at 267, 742 P.2d at 3.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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of the trial, therefore, was never presented.' 37 On appeal, the defendant
argued that the bifurcation of the trial compromised findings of compar-
ative negligence."' The court of appeals disagreed and held that the
evidence relevant only to the derivative claims was properly excluded in
the first trial. '39 The jury's determination of the primary claim eliminated
the need for a trial on the secondary claim."0
IX. MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL
In State v. Sena,"'4 the New Mexico Supreme Court considered what
standards should be applied in deciding whether to grant a new trial on
the basis of newly discovered evidence, in particular, when a witness
recants prior testimony.'42 The court stated that to succeed, the party
requesting a new trial must show that the newly discovered evidence (1)
will probably change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been
discovered since trial, (3) could not have been discovered before trial by
the exercise of due diligence, (4) is material, (5) is not merely cumulative,
and (6) is not merely impeaching or contradicting. "13
Where the newly discovered evidence consists of the recantation of a
witness' prior testimony, the following factors should be considered: (1)
whether the original verdict was based on uncorroborated testimony; (2)
whether the recantation occurred under circumstances free from suspicion
of undue influence or pressure from any source; (3) whether the record
discloses the possibility of collusion between the parties and the witness
between the time of trial and the retraction; and (4) whether the witness
admitted her perjury on the witness stand, thereby subjecting herself to
prosecution. '"In this case the court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial where the testimony of the
witness who later recanted was corroborated by a second witness. 15
X. COSTS
A. Apportionment of Costs on the Basis of Comparative Fault
Under New Mexico law the trial court may, or may not, within its
137. Id.
138. Id. at 268, 742 P.2d at 4.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. State v. Sena, 105 N.M. 686, 736 P.2d 491 (1987).
142. Although State v. Sena was a criminal case, the factors which the trial court should consider
in its decision whether to grant a new trial are the same in civil actions. See Hill v. Burnworth, 85
N.M. 615, 514 P.2d 1312 (Ct. App. 1973).
143. Sena, 105 N.M. at 687, 736 P.2d at 492.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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discretion apportion costs on the basis of comparative fault."4 In Baca
v. Marquez,'47 a medical malpractice case, the jury apportioned liability
80% to plaintiff's decedent, 15% to Dr. Marquez and 5% to Dr. Kes-
selman. On the issue of costs, the trial court determined that plaintiff was
the prevailing party and allowed her to recover her costs from defendants
in proportion to their respective percentages of negligence. '48 On appeal,
the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding that trial courts are
under no compulsion to apportion costs on the basis of fault but may do
so, in their discretion. 149
B. Attorneys' Fees
Two cases decided in this survey year addressed whether attorneys'
fees may be awarded for defense of a counterclaim where there is either
a contractual or statutory basis for the award of attorneys' fees for the
prosecution of the principal claim. It is standard practice for suppliers of
goods or services to include a contractual provision providing for attor-
neys' fees should a lawsuit prove necessary to collect monies owing to
them. It is also standard practice, when such lawsuits are filed, to interpose
affirmative defenses and counterclaims for fraud, misrepresentation, breach
of contract and the like. The issue is whether the supplier is entitled to
attorneys' fees incurred in defense of these counterclaims or whether the
award of attorneys' fees is limited to prosecution of the principal action.
Although one may logically assume that the purpose of such contractual
provisions is to put the supplier in as good a position as he would have
been had the debt been paid without the necessity of legal action, New
Mexico law generally holds that attorneys' fees may not be awarded for
defense of such counterclaims.'°
This principle was affirmed in Thompson Drilling, Inc. v. Romig,"'5 a
suit to recover money due under a contract and for enforcement of a
mechanic's lien. Based on a provision of the contract, the district court
awarded Thompson Drilling attorneys' fees which included fees incurred
defending Romig's counterclaims for misrepresentation and breach of
contract.'52 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
146. See Baca v. Marquez, 105 N.M. 762, 737 P.2d 543 (1987), in which the court affirmed the
apportionment of costs on the basis of comparative fault and Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls, 102 N.M.
614, 698 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985), in which the court affirmed the district court's decision to
apportion costs on the basis of comparative fault.
147. Baca v. Marquez, 105 N.M. 762, 737 P.2d 543 (1987).
148. Id. at 763, 737 P.2d at 544.
149. Id.
150. State Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Rendon, 103 N.M. 698, 702-03, 712 P.2d 1360, 1364-65
(1986).
151. Thompson Drilling, Inc. v. Romig, 105 N.M. 701, 736 P.2d 979 (1987).
152. Id.
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fee was excessive in relation to the amount recovered and that attorneys'
fees should not have been awarded for defense of the counterclaims.' 53
In Hyatt v. Keil, 154 the court reached a similar result, holding that an
award of attorneys' fees greater than 300% of the judgment amount was
patently unreasonable.' 5 As in Romig, the apparent reason for the ex-
cessiveness of the attorneys' fees was the time and effort expended de-
fending counterclaims interposed by the defendant. '56 Although the court
did not adopt a rigid rule that attorneys' fees may never be awarded for
defending a counterclaim, it cautioned that such an award should be the
exception. '57
In view of the court's holdings in Thompson Drilling, Inc. v. Romig
and Hyatt v. Keil, contractual provisions for attorneys' fees should, in
the future, expressly address the issue of attorneys' fees incurred in the
defense of counterclaims. It would also be a wise practice to introduce
evidence in support of, and to obtain, findings of fact which track the
factors enumerated in Romig.
XI. VERDICT
In Bachicha v. Lewis, '58 the court considered whether handwritten notes
by the jury may be considered in support of a verdict and correctly held
that such "evidence" may not properly be considered either to support
or impeach a verdict.' 59 Bachicha arose out of a motor vehicle accident.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that instructions on sudden
emergency and excuse and justification were improperly given."6 De-
fendant argued that this error did not require reversal because notes written
by the jury indicated that the general verdict was based on a finding of
no proximate cause, as opposed to no negligence. 6' The court rejected
153. Id. at 705, 736 P.2d at 983. The court also enumerated several factors to be considered by
the district court in an award of attorney fees: (I) the time and labor required, considering the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required; (2) the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services; (3) the amount involved and the results obtained; (4) time limitations
imposed by the client or by circumstances; and (5) the experience, reputation and ability of the
attorney.
154. Hyatt v. Keil, 106 N.M. 3, 738 P.2d 121 (1987).
155. Id. at 4, 738 P.2d at 122.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 4-5, 738 P.2d at 122-23. It should be noted that the fact that the counterclaim proves
to be meritless is not a circumstance sufficiently exceptional to warrant attorneys' fees in defense
of the counterclaim. In Romig, the jury apparently found against the defendant on its counterclaims,
yet the court still reversed attorneys' fees awarded for defense of those counterclaims. 105 N.M. at
706, 736 P.2d at 984. The court provides no clue as to what circumstances might be exceptional
enough to warrant an award of attorneys' fees.
158. Bachicha v. Lewis, 105 N.M. 726, 737 P.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1987).
159. Id. at 730, 737 P.2d at 89.
160. Id. at 728-29, 737 P.2d at 87-88.
161. Id. at 729, 737 P.2d at 88.
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this argument, holding that handwritten notations do not provide a basis
for determining how the jury reached its verdict. '6 2 The court additionally
held that where an appellate court cannot tell whether the jury based its
verdict upon an improperly submitted issue, the proper procedure is to
reverse and remand for a new trial on all issues.'63
XII. NON-JURY TRIALS
Hickey v. Griggs, 64 was one of several recent cases which demonstrated
our supreme court's willingness to promote judicial economy by over-
looking technical errors which might otherwise result in remand. In Hickey,
the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law after
defendant had filed his notice of appeal.' 65 On appeal, defendant con-
tended, inter alia, that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law because of its failure to do so before the
notice of appeal was filed.' The court agreed that it was a technical
error to enter judgment without the required findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law but nonetheless held that where the findings of fact are
already a part of the record, it would be a misuse of judicial resources
to remand. '67 Justice Stowers dissented on this issue, stating that he would
remand for new findings of fact and conclusions of law, timely filed in
accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.'68
XIII. FINAL JUDGMENT
A. Determination of "No Just Reason for Delay"
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, Rule
1-054 permits the trial court to direct the entry of final judgment as to
one or more of the claims upon an express determination that there is
"no just reason for delay." In a number of cases this year, the appellate
courts found an abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that
there was no just reason for delay. In BankquestlFirst National Bank v.
LMT, Inc., 69 the bank sued LMT on its promissory note and to foreclose
on a mortgage. LMT counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, fraud and neg-
ligent misrepresentations. 70 The trial court granted summary judgment
162. Id. at 730, 737 P.2d at 89.
163. Id.
164. Hickey v. Griggs, 106 N.M. 27, 738 P.2d 899 (1987).
165. Id. at 28, 738 P.2d at 900.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 29, 738 P.2d at 901.
168. Id. at 31, 738 P.2d at 903.
169. Bankquest/First Nat'l Bank v. LMT, Inc., 105 N.M. 583, 734 P.2d 1266 (1987).
170. Id. at 584, 734 P.2d at 1267.
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on the bank's claims and, reserving ruling on LMT's counterclaims,
entered final judgment as to the bank's claims finding no just reason for
delay. "' On appeal, the court noted that as a matter of policy, fragmen-
tation in the adjudication of related legal or factual issues and piecemeal
appeals are to be avoided. 72 It held that where the claims and counter-
claims were interrelated and the counterclaim could result in a setoff, the
trial court had abused its discretion by finding no just reason for delay. 73
In Navajo Refining Co. v. Southern Union Refining Co., 171 the court
reaffirmed its position in Bankquest v. LMT. Plaintiff's original complaint
for sums owing under a contract contained seven counts. 75 Defendant's
first amended counterclaim contained eight counts. 176 The trial court granted
partial summary judgment on two of plaintiff's claims and, finding no
just reason for delay, entered final judgment. 1 7 Subsequently, a second
amended counterclaim and an amended complaint were filed. '7 On ap-
peal, the court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in making
the Rule 1-054(C)(1) determination that there was ho just reason for
delay.'79 In so holding, the court enumerated the following factors a trial
court should consider in its Rule 1-054 determination: (1) the interrelation
of adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the presence of claims which
might result in a setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; (3)
the possibility that the same issues might be the subject of a later appeal;
and (4) the fact that amended claims and counterclaims continue to be
filed after the entry of partial summary judgment.8 0
In Graham v. Cocherell,'' the court held that Rule 1-054 does not
permit the district court to certify as final a partial adjudication of a single
claim. Graham involved a struggle for voting power among the stock-
holders of a closely held corporation. 8 2 The business was incorporated
in 1976.13 Plaintiff Davis and defendants Robert Cocherell and Charles
Poyer were the original directors.' 4 The directors voted to accept offers
from themselves and from Robert Cocherell's son, defendant John Coch-
171. Id. at 585, 734 P.2d at 1268.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Navajo Ref. Co. v. Southern Union Ref. Co., 105 N.M. 616, 735 P.2d 533 (1987).
175. Id. at 616, 735 P.2d at 533.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 617, 735 P.2d at 534.
180. Id.
181. Graham v. Cocherell, 105 N.M. 401, 733 P.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1987).
182. Id. at 402-03, 733 P.2d at 371-72.
183. Id.
184. Id.',
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erell, to subscribe for common stock in the corporation. "5 Robert Coch-
erell, Poyer and Davis paid for their stock, but John Cocherell did not. '86
Subsequently, a new investor, plaintiff Graham, joined the group as a
one-fourth owner. 1
87
By July of 1977, John Cocherell still had not paid for his stock, and
the directors voted unanimously to rescind the 1976 authorization.'88 In
1983, John Cocherell advised the directors that he wished to exercise his
subscription rights to the stock.' 89 The board considered a motion to
authorize the president to issue the stock, but the motion failed on a tie
vote. "9 Notwithstanding the failure of the motion, the corporate president,
Robert Cocherell, issued his son the stock, resulting in the lawsuit.'9 '
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that Robert
Cocherell lacked authority to issue the stock to his son without the au-
thority of the board of directors.' 92 The trial court granted this motion
and entered an order which recited that there was no just reason for delay
and ordered that John's shares be placed in escrow until further order of
the court.' 93
On appeal, the court found that the trial court's order of partial summary
judgment did not conclusively dispose of any of the issues in the lawsuit
because the question remained whether John Cocherell's subscription was
still valid since there had been no call for payment. "' The court held,
therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal because the
judgment was not final.' 95 Under Rule 1-054(C)(1), the court may enter
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims upon
an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay. The
rule, however, does not authorize the district court, by certificate, to make
final a partial adjudication of a single claim.'"
B. Finality for Purposes of Appeal
In Maitlan v. Getty,197 and Gonzales v. Maes,98 the court clarified when
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 402-03, 733 P.2d at 371-72.
189. Id. at 403, 733 P.2d at 372.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 404-05, 733 P.2d at 373-74.
195. Id. at 405, 733 P.2d at 374.
196. Id. at 404, 733 P.2d at 373.
197. Maitlan v. Getty, 105 N.M. 370, 733 P.2d I (Ct. App. 1987).
198. Gonzales v. Maes, 106 N.M. 342, 742 P.2d 1047 (1987).
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a dismissal without prejudice operates as a final appealable order. In
Maitlan, one issue on appeal was whether the district court's order dis-
missing plaintiff's workers' compensation complaint without prejudice
on grounds of prematurity was sufficiently final to be appealable.'" The
district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. It found that plaintiff was
receiving the full workers' compensation benefits to which he was entitled
because he had never requested his employer to provide the additional
benefits he was seeking in this suit.2" The court of appeals acknowledged
that a dismissal without prejudice is usually not a final order from which
appeal may be taken.2"' The court reasoned, however, that to hold that
a dismissal without prejudice on grounds of prematurity in a workers'
compensation case was not final would effectively preclude the worker
from ever obtaining review of the trial court's determination that he was
receiving full benefits.2 2 Because the court looks to the substance rather
than the form of an order in determining whether it is final for purposes
of appeal, the court held that in this case the order was sufficiently final
to be appealable." 3 To the extent inconsistent with this opinion, the court
overruled Armijo v. Co-Con Construction Co.2°4
In Gonzales,205 the district court, on August 27, 1986, entered its order
dismissing the complaint without prejudice subject to reinstatement upon
request to the court. On September 2, 1986, plaintiff filed a motion to
reinstate the cause upon the trial docket. 2' Eight months elapsed before
the district court notified counsel by letter that plaintiff's motion to rein-
state was granted. 2 7 Gonzales, a counterclaimant, then petitioned the
supreme court for a writ of prohibition or of superintending control,
claiming that the court had lost jurisdiction to proceed with the case.20 8
The supreme court sought to clarify the law as it relates to such docket
control orders as follows: (1) Where an order of dismissal without prej-
udice contains a condition, the order becomes final upon the expiration
of the time set for the condition; (2) where the order of dismissal states
a condition not limited in time, a reasonable time of 90 days may be
inferred; and (3) an order dismissing a party's entire complaint without
authorizing or specifying a definite time for leave to file an amended
199. Maitlan, 105 N.M. at 371, 733 P.2d at 2.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 372, 733 P.2d at 3.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.; Armijo v. Co-Con Constr. Co., 92 N.M. 295, 587 P.2d 442 (Ct. App. 1978).
205. Gonzales v. Maes, 106 N.M. 342, 742 P.2d 1047 (1987).
206. Id. at 343, 742 P.2d at 1048.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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complaint is a final order for purposes of appeal. 2° In this case, the court
held that plaintiff had satisfied the condition by requesting reinstatement
within a reasonable period of time (five days); therefore, the dismissal
never became a final order.2t °
XIV. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
In Jimenez v. Walgreens-Payless, 21 , the court reaffirmed its earlier hold-
ing in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp. of America,2 '2 that a
trial court does not have inherent power to dismiss an action for failure
to prosecute, independent of the rules of civil procedure or a rule of court.
In Jimenez, plaintiff filed his complaint on February 9, 1981, and the
answer was filed on March 2, 1981 .2 3 The next pleading to appear in
the record was a request for hearing signed by Jimenez' attorney and
dated January 6, 1983.214 The record reflected that on February 9, 1983,
two subpoenas were requested by Jimenez' attorney and issued, but no
copies of the subpoenas appeared in the district court's file. 2 5 The next
document in the record was a request for hearing, again signed by Jimenez'
attorney, dated June 29, 1983.216 The record next reflected a motion to
vacate filed by Jimenez' attorney.217 On October 4, 1984, the court entered
its order dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute. 2 8 The order
was issued without prior notice to Jimenez and without giving Jimenez
the opportunity for a hearing. 19
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court
had inherent power to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute. 2 ' The
supreme court, however, reversed, holding that the trial court did not
have inherent power, independent of statute or rule, to dismiss a cause
for failure to prosecute. 22' The court further held that if the trial court
was relying on Rule 1-041 (e), -the court erred by not allowing a hearing
at which the parties could have presented evidence.22
209. Id.
210. Id. at 344, 742 P.2d at 1049.
211. Jimenez v. Walgreens-Payless, 106 N.M. 256, 741 P.2d 1377 (1987).
212. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp. of Am., 83 N.M. 690, 496 P.2d 1086 (1972).
213. Jimenez, 106 N.M. at 257, 741 P.2d at 1378.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 257-58, 741 P.2d at 1378-79.
220. Id. at 258, 741 P.2d at 1379.
221. Id. at 259, 741 P.2d at 1380.
222. Id. at 258, 741 P.2d at 1379.
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XV. RES JUDICATA/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. Res Judicata
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel govern the pre-
clusive effect of a judgment upon a subsequent action.223 Under the doc-
trine of res judicata, a final judgment will preclude a second action if the
parties to the first and second lawsuit are the same or in privity, the cause
of action is the same in both suits, and there has been a final judgment
on the merits in the first suit.224 In Slide-A-Ride of Las Cruces, Inc. v.
Citizens Bank of Las Cruces,2 25 the court reaffirmed the longstanding rule
that the failure to assert compulsory counterclaims bars their subsequent
assertion in a later action. In Slide-A-Ride, Citizens Bank filed the first
lawsuit against the Nissens and the Goulds on their guaranties of certain
notes made in conjunction with their pursuit of a business named Slide-
A-Ride.226 The Nissens and Goulds answered and counterclaimed for
breach of contract and fiduciary duty, but for reasons not stated in the
opinion, they later amended their answer to omit the counterclaims.227
Subsequently, the court awarded the bank summary judgment.228
After the conclusion of the above action, Slide-A-Ride, the Nissens
and the Goulds, sued Citizens Bank for breach of contract and fiduciary
duties. 229 The trial court dismissed the Nissens' and Goulds' claims on
the grounds of res judicata but denied the bank's motion for summary
judgment as against Slide-A-Ride. 23" The Nissens and Goulds appealed
and Citizens Bank cross-appealed.23'
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Nissens'
and Goulds' claims were compulsory counterclaims in the first lawsuit
and, therefore, barred. 23 2 On Citizen's cross-appeal, the court rejected
the bank's argument that res judicata should also apply as against Slide-
A-Ride because it was in privity with the Nissens and Goulds; the court
held that there was substantial evidence to negate any claim that the
corporation controlled the litigation in the first lawsuit.233
In Salas v. Bolagh,234 the court held that a judgment reversed and
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13-17 (1982).
224. Myers v. Olson, 100 N.M. 745, 676 P.2d 822 (1984).
225. Slide-A-Ride of Las Cruces, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces, 105 N.M. 433, 733 P.2d
1316 (1987).
226. Id. at 435, 733 P.2d at 1318.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 436, 733 P.2d at 1319.
233. Id. at 437, 733 P.2d at 1320.
234. Salas v. Bolagh, 106 N.M. 613, 747 P.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1987).
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remanded on appeal is not a final judgment for purposes of res judicata.
In Salas, plaintiffs obtained a judgment against Bolagh.235 In an attempt
to collect the judgment, plaintiffs sued Roberts and Bolagh, seeking to
foreclose on the Bolaghs' equitable interest in a real estate contract by
which the Bolaghs had purchased certain real property from Roberts.236
The Bolaghs subsequently defaulted under the real estate contract, but
plaintiffs were not notified and the default was not cured. 237 After the
time to cure had lapsed, the Roberts moved to dismiss and the trial court
entered judgment for the Roberts, releasing the Notice of Lis Pendens
and dismissing the Salas' foreclosure suit. 238 The Salases appealed and
the supreme court reversed and remanded the trial court's judgment, with
instructions to set aside the dismissal and allow a period of time for the
Salases to cure the default.239
While the appeal was pending, however, the Roberts sold the property
to a third party, the Kennedys. 2' The Salases, in attempting to cure the
default, discovered that the property had been sold and amended their
original complaint to include the Kennedys. 24 ' After the Roberts answered
the amended complaint, the trial court granted them a dismissal on the
grounds of res judicata.242
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the doctrine of resjudicata applies only to final judgments, and ajudgment
is not final when it has been reversed by an appellate court.243 The court
also noted that the case had not been fully adjudicated because it had
been remanded. 2"
In Silva v. State,245 the New Mexico Supreme Court realigned New
Mexico with federal law by eliminating the requirement of mutuality of
parties under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The case also clarified
when two actions may be considered the "same cause of action" for
purposes of res judicata. In Silva, plaintiff sued the State of New Mexico,
the Corrections and Criminal Rehabilitation Department and others, al-
leging negligence in the death of Manuel Silva, who committed suicide
by hanging himself while incarcerated at the Central Correctional Facility
in Los Lunas. 2" Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the
235. Id. at 614, 747 P.2d at 260.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 615, 747 P.2d at 261.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
246. Id. at 473, 745 P.2d 381.
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basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, arguing that the earlier case
of Duran v. Anaya,247 (Duran), had conclusively decided all issues of
liability. 248 The trial court denied this motion, and subsequently dismissed
the suit on other grounds.249
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
res judicata did not apply because the federal court action, which inquired
into whether defendants were in compliance with the Duran consent
decree, was not the same cause of action as the personal representative's
action for wrongful death.25° The court stated that res judicata applies
only when the prior and subsequent actions are identical in four respects:
(1) same parties or privies; (2) same capacity or character of persons for
or against whom the claim is made; (3) same cause of action; and (4)
same subject matter. 25' The court held that when the duty sued upon stems
from different roots, the suits arise from different causes of action, even
if both actions involve essentially the same course of wrongful conduct.252
Additionally, the court held that where the ultimate facts necessary for
the resolution of two suits are different, and the issues necessarily dis-
positive in the prior cause are different from those in the subsequent
cause, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.253
In Carter v. Thurber,254 the court held that, for purposes of res judicata,
it does not matter which action was filed first. Thus, a subsequently filed
action can operate as res judicata if it comes to final judgment prior to
its earlier filed counterpart and the other requirements of the doctrine are
met.255 Carter was an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing plain-
tiff's state court action with prejudice on the basis that those claims were
barred under the doctrine of res judicata by reason of a prior dismissal
for lack of prosecution in a federal district court action.256 Plaintiff argued
that summary judgment could not be awarded on the basis of res judicata
without the federal court action being made a part of the record, and that
the application of res judicata was not proper because the state court
action was filed prior to the federal court action. 257 The court held that
it would waste judicial resources to remand to make the federal court
pleadings a part of the record where, as in this case, there was no dispute
247. No. 77-721-JB (D.N.M. June 27, 1986).
248. Silva, 106 N.M. at 473, 745 P.2d at 381.
249. id.
250. Id. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Carter v. Thurber, 106 N.M. 429, 744 P.2d 557 (1987).
255. Id. at 432, 744 P.2d at 560.
256. Id. at 430, 744 P.2d at 558.
257. Id.
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over what the federal record disclosed.25 The court also rejected plaintiff's
second argument, holding that res judicata applied regardless of what suit
was filed first.259
B. Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of ultimate facts
and issues actually and necessarily determined in a prior suit.2" Tradi-
tionally, mutuality of parties was a requirement for the application of the
doctrine.26 ' That is, the party asserting the doctrine as well as the party
against whom it was asserted had to have been parties to the prior lawsuit,
or in privity with those parties. In Silva v. State,262 New Mexico aligned
itself with the federal courts and the majority of state jurisdictions by
abandoning the requirement of mutuality:263
We hold that the doctrine of defensive collateral estoppel may be
applied when a defendant seeks to preclude a plaintiff from reliti-
gating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost, re-
gardless of whether defendant was privy to the prior suit; and that
the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel may be applied when a
plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the
defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully, regardless of whether
plaintiff was privy to the prior action.2"
By way of guidance in future cases, the court stated that the trial court
should decide whether a party against whom estoppel is asserted had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action .265 Collateral
estoppel is not to be applied where the record is insufficient to determine
what issues were actually and necessarily determined by prior litigation.2"
Once a movant has made a prima facie showing that collateral estoppel
should apply, the trial court must consider the countervailing equities
including prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, procedural
opportunities, and inconvenience of forum as discussed in Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore.267 Contrary to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Parklane Hosiery, however, the New Mexico court stated that
the trial court should consider the presence or absence of a jury as well
258. Id. at 431, 744 P.2d at 559.
259. Id. at 432, 744 P.2d at 560.
260. Silva, 106 N.M. at 474, 745 P.2d at 382.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
263. For a discussion of the facts in Silva, see notes 245-249 and related text.
264. Id. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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as whether a special master or other alternative or administrative dispute
resolution techniques were involved in the first lawsuit.26
XVI. SETTING ASIDE OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
In Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc.,269 plaintiff brought a products
liability suit against various defendants, claiming personal injuries and
damages. Defendant, Henry L. Hanson, Inc. (Hanson), a foreign cor-
poration, had no registered agent for the service of process in New Mex-
ico, and plaintiff attempted service by serving the Secretary of State
pursuant to Section 38-1-6(C).27° The Secretary of State, however, never
forwarded a copy of the process or otherwise notified Hanson as required
by that statute.27' After the entry of default, Hanson entered its general
appearance and moved to set aside the default judgment.272 The trial court
denied Hanson's motion and Hanson appealed.273
The court discussed two issues on appeal: first, whether the failure of
the Secretary of State to give defendant notice, resulting in a default
judgment, constituted a denial of due process,274 and second, whether
Hanson's general entry of appearance validated the judgment, curing
defects in the service of process.275 The court declined to base its decision
on the failure of the Secretary of State to comply with the requirements
of Section 38-1-6(C), holding that since service of process is procedural,
the supreme court rule (Rule 1-004) controls.276 The court held that the
Secretary of State's failure to provide Hanson with notice of the lawsuit
denied Hanson due process; the court reversed and remanded for a trial
on the merits.277 The court further held that while entry of a general
appearance might cure defective process prior to the entry of a default
268. Edwards v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Clovis, 102 N.M. 396, 696 P.2d 484 (Ct.
App. 1985).
269. Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc., 106 N.M. 25, 738 P.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1987).
270. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-6(C) (1978) provides as follows:
Upon receipt of the process and fee, the secretary of state shall forthwith give
notice by telegraph, charges prepaid, to the foreign corporation at its principal
place of business outside the state of the service of process, and shall forward
to that office by registered or certified mail a copy of the process. Where the
secretary of state has no record of the principal office of the foreign corporation
outside the state, he shall forward the copy of the process to the places des-
ignated as its principal office in an affidavit filed with the secretary of state by
the plaintiff in the suit or by his attorney.
271. Abarca, 106 N.M. at 25, 738 P.2d at 520.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 26, 738 P.2d at 521.
277. Id.
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judgment, the general entry of appearance which Hanson made in this
case did not cure the lack of notice.278
In Rodriguez v. Conant,2 79 the court held that a default judgment may
be set aside for failure to provide notice to the party in default, even
though the rules of civil procedure do* not require such notice.2 8° In
Rodriguez, plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, alleging
wrongful termination and defamation.28' Rodriguez, not initially a party
to the action, had administered the polygraph examination which led to
plaintiff's termination.282 In April 1981, Rodriguez, although not a party,
attended a discovery deposition.283 Subsequently, plaintiff amended her
complaint, naming Rodriguez and additional defendants.284 Rodriguez
was personally served on November 1, 1981, but he made no appearance,
answer or other response to the summons and, on January 4, 1982, the
trial court entered a partial default judgment against him on the issue of
liability.285 Subsequently, on April 20, 1983, without notice to Rodriguez,
a hearing was held on the issue of damages, and on May 4, 1983, the
district court entered a default judgment, awarding plaintiff $5,000 in
compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages, as prayed for
in her complaint.286
Rodriguez became aware of the default judgment when plaintiff sub-
poenaed him in aid of execution.287 On August 25, 1983, he filed a motion
to set aside the default judgment. 28  Rodriguez admitted finding the sum-
mons and amended complaint in his files, but could not recall being
personally served, and stated that had he been aware of the claims he
would have contacted counsel and responded to the court's process.289
On July 13, 1984, the district court granted Rodriguez' motion and set
aside the default judgment. 2' The court of appeals reversed and ordered
the reinstatement of the default judgment, holding that the district court
had abused its discretion in setting aside the default without sufficient
grounds for relief. 29 The New Mexico Supreme Court granted defendant's
278. Id.
279. Rodriguez v. Conant, 105 N.M. 746, 737 P.2d 527 (1987).
280. Id. at 751, 737 P.2d at 532.
281. Id. at 747, 737 P.2d at 528.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 747-48, 737 P.2d at 528-29.
286. Id. at 748, 737 P.2d at 529.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 751, 737 P.2d at 532.
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petition for a writ of certiorari, reversed the court of appeals' decision,
affirmed the district court's order, and remanded for a trial on the merits.292
Two issues were presented on appeal: (1) Whether the default judgment
was void because defendant was not notified of the hearing held on
damages, and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion under
Rule 1-060(B) by setting aside the default judgment.293 Whether Rodri-
guez was entitled to notice of the damage hearing depended on whether
he had entered an appearance in the suit. 294 The court held that defendant's
attendance at a deposition nearly eight months before he was served could
not be considered an appearance under Rule 1-055(B); consequently, he
was not entitled to notice under Rule 1-055.29' The court held, nonethe-
less, that the failure to give defendant notice when his whereabouts was
known, along with the fact that the default judgment against him was
$55,000 while plaintiff's claims against her employer were settled for
$1,900, were sufficient grounds justifying relief under Rule 1-060(B)(6),
which permits relief from a judgment for "other reasons justifying re-
lief."296
XVII. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Sunwest Bank of Clovis, NA v. Clovis IV 97 concerned a controversy
which arose out of a default by certain ethanol plant developers under
an industrial revenue bond issue. Sunwest Bank, as trustee for the City
of Clovis, brought an action for declaratory judgment and damages against
Titan Energy Engineering, Inc. (Titan), and against various partnerships
who were Titan's successors in interest.298 The bank sought a declaration
that the lease and development agreement between the City and Titan
was terminated due to Titan's default in payments; the bank also sought
damages. 299 The trial court entered a default judgment against Titan and
a partial summary judgment against its successors in interest, declaring
that the lease was terminated with respect to the partnerships and that
Sunwest Bank was entitled to legal and physical possession of the prop-
erty. 300
One issue on appeal was the propriety of declaratory relief under the
circumstances. The partnerships (successors in interest) argued that, be-
292. Id.
293. Id. at 747, 737 P.2d at 528.
294. Id. at 749, 737 P.2d at 530.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 750, 737 P.2d at 531.
297. Sunwest Bank of Clovis, NA v. Clovis IV, 106 N.M. 149, 740 P.2d 699 (1987).
298. Id. at 150, 740 P.2d at 700.
299. Id. at 151, 740 P.2d at 701.
300. Id.
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cause of unresolved claims for past due rentals and accelerated future
payments, the trial court's decision to grant declaratory relief resulted in
piecemeal trial of issues, potential inconsistent relief, and greater expense
to the litigants and the courts, constituting an abuse of discretion." 1
The exercise of discretion to grant or refuse declaratory relief under
Section 44-6-7,302 must be based on good reason.3"3 The purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations, is to be liberally
construed and administered." ° Although the potential for piecemeal lit-
igation is an important factor, no one factor necessarily controls the court's
discretion in deciding whether it should entertain an action for declaratory
relief.30 5 Furthermore, the trial court may grant declaratory and non-
declaratory relief in a single action. 3" Considering these principles, the
court held that the district court had before it sufficient evidence to clarify
the rights and status of the parties regarding the default and the question
of whether the partnerships should have a further right to possession or
repurchase of the property.30 7 Thus the district court had properly entered
a declaratory judgment on this issue.308
XVIII. CONCLUSION
Procedural issues continue to provide the courts with a wide variety
of appellate issues. The scope of this article does not permit a discussion
of every case which was decided during the survey year. The survey
year's decisions are for the most part in accord with prior precedent. The
major exception to that statement is the supreme court's abandonment of
the requirement of mutuality which allows parties to offensively use
collateral estoppel in cases where imposition of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel previously would not have been allowed.
301. Id.
302. N.M. STAT. ANN. §44-6-7 (1978).
303. 106 N.M. at 154, 740 P.2d at 705.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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